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ARTIFICIAL CREATIVITY AND 
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE
ABSTRACT
It is hard to deny that the notions of creativity and intelligence are 
inherently connected. But what does this correlation amount to? Is 
creativity a necessary desideratum of intelligence? On the other hand, 
does the fact of being intelligent necessarily imply being creative as well? 
The aim of this paper is to explore these questions and to contribute to 
the discussion regarding the connections between the notions of creativity 
and intelligence. In order to do so, I draw on the results obtained from 
a study on the public perceptions and attitudes in relation to the use 
of AI in the creative sector conducted at the University of Nottingham. 
Through this discussion I aim to test the hypothesis that the key features 
of creativity correspond to aspects that are essential for the realization 
of Artificial General Intelligence, e.g. flexibility, domain knowledge, and 
common-sense. After having illustrated the parallels between the two 
concepts, I contend that while creativity is a crucial component of general 
intelligence, the constituents needed to build an AGI may not be sufficient 
to design creative artificial systems. I close the paper by tentatively 
suggesting how the motivations behind the discontent expressed by the 
participants against creative AI can be explained through the uncanny 
valley phenomenon. 

























































In the last decades, machine learning systems have learnt to replicate 
some processes of the human brain, such as the process of induction, 
quite successfully. However, they struggle to reproduce other processes, 
such as common sense and tacit knowledge, which help us adapt with 
flexibility to different environments. What do artificial systems need in 
order to overcome these challenges? Is creative thinking a requirement 
to achieve the flexibility needed to successfully interact with uncertain 
environments and with other agents?
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate regarding 
computational creativity and to the exploration of the connections that 
exist between creativity and natural and artificial intelligence. After a first 
section where I provide an overview of the history of research on Artificial 
General Intelligence, in the central part of the paper I present the results 
of a survey conducted at the University of Nottingham in September 2019 
on the attribution of creativity to Artificial Intelligence (henceforth AI).
By drawing on the replies given by participants to this study, I intend 
to test the hypothesis (H1) that in order to acquire creative abilities AI 
needs to develop aspects that are required to progress from Narrow to 
Artificial General Intelligence (henceforth AGI). Indeed, I contend that 
many of the features that systems need to develop in order to achieve 
general intelligence are aspects that they need to possess also to earn the 
attribute “creative”.
In section 3, I discuss how some of the participants’ replies confirm 
the hypothesis that the features that state-of-the-art AI lacks and that 
would instead be essential to creativity correspond to the aspects of 
intelligence which researchers are working on in order to achieve a more 
powerful and broad kind of AI. The results of this study should not be 
intended as unassailable evidence of the correlation between intelligence 
and creativity. Rather, they should be interpreted as a starting point for a 
discussion on how this interrelation unfolds and on how its analysis may 
promote the progress of research in both sectors.
While the results of the survey corroborate the work that is currently 
being done by AI researchers, in section 4 I put forward a second, 
tentative, hypothesis (H2): while the development of computational 
creativity may yield substantial advancements toward AGI, the opposite 
may not be true. Namely, the acquisition of features that are necessary to 
AGI may not be sufficient to design artificial systems that are recognized 
as creative.
A result that emerged from the survey is a generalized discontent in 
respect to the application of AI to the creative sector. If we assume H2 is true, 
then, we cannot explain this discontent through the current lack of general 
intelligence in state-of-the-art AI. I propose that the motivation that lies behind 
the audience’s disappointment could be explained through the uncanny valley 
theory. Although tentative, this argument can contribute to have a better 
understanding of the relationship between humans and technology when the 
























































86 2. ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE
Often the terms “Artificial General Intelligence” and “Human-level Artificial 
Intelligence” are used interchangeably as synonyms. However, this 
does not mean that their meanings match entirely. Indeed, while they 
both refer to a non-natural kind of intelligence, they direct the attention 
to different aspects of it. As Goertzel points out, the term “Human-level 
AI” is somewhat ill-defined, since it is hard to find a reliable tool to 
identify a hierarchy of natural and artificial kinds of intelligence. Loosely 
speaking, Human-level AI refers to an AI whose performance can match 
the standard performance of human intelligence. The concept of AGI, 
for its part, is more general and more fundamental. The notion of AGI is 
not, in fact, coupled with that of human-being, and it is not assessed in 
comparison to human performance. 
AGI can be defined as a non-natural kind of intelligence “that can 
solve a variety of complex problems in a variety of different domains, and 
that controls itself autonomously, with its own thoughts, worries, feelings, 
strengths, weaknesses and predispositions.” (Pennachin, Goertzel, 2007, 
p. 1) An AGI should learn to adapt to various environments and solve different 
problems in given situations, to appreciate the context in which it is situated, 
and to form connections between apparently different areas of application.
The term “AGI” gained widespread use in the field of AI after 2002, 
when Cassio Pennachin and Ben Goertzel used it as a title for their edited 
book which grouped contributions on approaches to AI systems that 
could solve broader and more complex problems than narrow kinds of 
AI (Pennachin, Goertzel, 2007, p. 2). The interest of researchers for the 
construction of a powerful intelligence with broad capabilities can be dated 
back to earlier times, though.
In the Fifties Allen Newell and Herbert Simon conducted several 
experiments toward the creation of general intelligence programs. It is 
the case of the General Problem Solver, a program designed in 1959 as 
a method to solve a variety of different problems, of the Logic Theorist, 
a program “capable of discovering proofs for theorems in elementary 
symbolic logic” (Newell, Shaw, Simon, 1962, p. 67), and of BACON, a 
program which re-discovered Kepler’s Third Law and other laws of physics 
(Simon, 1985, pp. 9-10). Simon and his colleagues were confident of the 
bright future of AI and they shared the thought that, in a not so distant future, 
computers “should be able to take advantage of these capabilities to overtake 
humans: it was only a matter of a few years before suitable programming 
would let them do it.” (Crevier, 1993, p. 5) Their predictions, however, turned 
out to be overly optimistic, so much so that 70 years later we still cannot say 
we have been able to build an AI that can reach human intelligence.
The aim of expanding the fields of application of AI and its potential 
is nevertheless very much alive and thriving in the AI community. This can 
be seen in the development of programs that can teach themselves how 
to play a variety of different games, like AlphaZero (Silver et al., 2017), in 
the latest innovations in the field of Natural Language Processing, with 
























































87 context, like BERT (Devlin et al., 2019), and in the design of mobile robots 
that can navigate unstructured environments (Fabisch et al., 2019). 
Still, it may be argued that, although impressive, these developments 
go all in the direction of a narrow kind of intelligence. AlphaZero, for 
example, cannot understand the nuances of a dialogue in a novel and 
Boston Dynamics robots cannot, for now, teach themselves how to play 
chess. The state-of-the-art text-generation program released by OpenAI 
in 2020, GPT3, is considered by many a radical step toward AGI.1 And 
yet, although the program engages in an extremely complex task, such as 
that of generating human language, it still has not achieved the breadth 
and flexibility that characterizes human intelligence and behavior (Brown 
et al., 2020). Reactions to the AGI program range from the optimism 
of researchers like Goertzel all the way to the skepticism expressed by 
people like Yan LeCun or Andrew Ng and to a more worried attitude on the 
basis of the potential threat that it represents (Bostrom, 2014).
I will not enter the debate on the hopes and concerns posed by the 
progress of AI, since this would go beyond the aims of this paper. Still, 
while the development of more powerful and broader capabilities of AI 
undeniably raises ethical and societal questions which are worth being 
discussed (Yampolskiy, Fox, 2013), we are still far from the design of 
system that can reach, let alone surpass, human intellectual abilities.
In section 3, I will discuss how the challenges researchers meet in 
programming AGI systems are correlated to aspects that are essential 
also to develop artificial creativity. To support this claim, I draw on the 
results obtained from a survey on the public reception of creative artificial 
systems that I present in the next section.
3. SURVEY ON COMPUTATIONAL CREATIVITY
Since the attention brought to the field by Guilford’s speech on creativity 
(Guilford, 1950), many studies have focused on the nature of creativity 
and on its application to various domains.2 The question of whether, 
alongside humans and other animals, also artificial systems can be 
creative has gained more attention since the Nineties, with the work on 
computational creativity by Margaret Boden (2004). In the last decades, 
many are the programs designed with the aim to build systems that exhibit 
creativity in visual arts (Colton, 2012), music (Eigenfeldt, Pasquier, 2011), 
poetry (Gatti et al., 2012), and even fashion and cooking (Morris et al., 2012).
The scope of this analysis is not to assess the technical performance 
achieved by state-of-the-art technologies in the creative sector. Rather, the 
aim is to examine the opinions and perceptions that scholars, creatives, 
and the general public have towards AI that produces “Art”. To this end, in 
this section I discuss the results obtained from a study conducted at the 
University of Nottingham.
The study “Perceptions of Creativity in Human and Artificial 
Intelligence” has been conducted in September 2019 as part of the 
research priority area project “Audience Perceptions of AI Interaction in 
1  See https://www.theverge.
com/21346343/gpt-3-explainer-
openai-examples-errors-agi-potential.
2  For an overview on the theme 
of creativity in the literature and 
on the different definitions that 
can be given of it, see Boden, 
2004; Elton, 1995; Gaut, 2010; 
Glover, Ronning, Reynolds, 1989; 
Moruzzi, 2020b; Newell, Shaw, 
Simon, 1962; Runco, Jaeger, 2012; 
Keith Sawyer, 2012; Simon, 1985; 
























































88 Different Modes of Engagement”, in collaboration with the Department of 
Humanities and Medicine of the University of Nottingham. 3 The survey 
was intended as a limited, preliminary study designed to raise questions 
and pave the way for further research on the topic. It included two parts: 
an online questionnaire, completed by 203 participants, and two focus 
groups, with 10 participants in each group and a duration of one hour each.
A large group of participants of both the online questionnaire (67.5%) 
and the focus group (25%) came from an academic background or were 
still undertaking their studies (33% for the online questionnaire, and 
35% for the focus group). The limitations of the study derive then quite 
clearly from the small and unrepresentative sample group. To have a 
more statistically relevant sample it would, therefore, be recommended 
to carry out a subsequent study that focuses on a different sector of the 
population.
After a screening section, aimed at measuring the familiarity 
participants had with AI and their engagement with the art sector, 
participants were asked their opinion regarding the application of AI in 
a range of different sectors. The central part of the questionnaire asked 
participants to indicate the principal features of creativity and to give 
answers to targeted questions about the use of AI in the creation of 
supposedly artistic products. Lastly, the questionnaire closed with some 
general questions on the participants’ opinion regarding the possibility for 
AI to be creative. 
What emerges from the replies given by participants in the 
questionnaire is a generalized disappointment in respect to the creation 
of artistic products by AI systems. To the questions “If you found out that 
the painting/music album you just bought was not painted/composed 
by a human but by an AI, how would you feel about it?”, participants 
did not react with much enthusiasm. The 31% of participants would be 
positively surprised if the painting was created by an AI and 35.5% if 
the music album was composed by an AI, but almost the same number 
of participants would react in a neutral way (36.5% for the music album 
and 36.9% for the painting). The 28.1% and 32% would instead be 
disappointed in finding out that the music album and painting respectively 
were AI-generated. Even clearer is the participants’ opinion when asked 
“If you had the choice of buying a painting created by a human and one 
created by AI, which one would you buy?”. The 90.1% of participants 
would buy a painting created by a human and the 93.1%, when asked the 
same question but in relation to a music album, would prefer to buy an 
album composed by a human.
The central task that the questionnaire presented to participants 
was to answer some questions about two paintings and two musical 
clips. Participants were not aware of the fact that one of the two paintings 
was created by an AI and one of the two clips was AI-generated. Despite 
the disappointment expressed by participants in respect to the AI-
generated painting and music given as example in the test, 4 the majority 
of participants agreed with the possibility for AI to be creative: 40.9% 
of participants replied “Yes”, and 11.8% replied “Certainly”. Even more 
3  The other members of the team 
that participated in the project are 
Dr. Elvira Perez Vallejos, School of 
Medicine, Dr. Nicholas Baragwanath, 
Department of Music, Dr. Zachary 
Hoskins, Department of Philosophy.
4  Unaware of their provenance, 
40.9% of participants agreed that 
Painting 1 (human-generated) 
was creative or very creative, 
while 28.6% claimed that Painting 
2 (AI-generated) was creative or 
very creative. As for the clips, 35% 
of participants agreed that Clip 2 
(human-generated) was creative 
or very creative, while only 20.2% 
claimed that Clip 1 (AI-generated) 
was creative or very creative. The 
results obtained are similar also in 
respect to other parameters: the 
human-generated painting and 
clip obtained higher percentage 
of confidence as for their novelty, 
pleasantness, and surprisingness 
and participants liked them more than 
























































89 optimistic is the reaction to the question “Do you think humans can 
be more creative with the help of AI?”. In this case the 44.3% replied 
“Yes” and the 29.6% is certain of the benefit that may come from the 
collaboration between humans and AI.
The details of the survey and of its results are reported elsewhere 
(Moruzzi, 2020a). In this paper, I focus on what emerged from the results 
of the survey in relation to the following hypothesis: H1: in order to acquire 
creative abilities, AI systems need to develop features that are necessary 
also to progress from Narrow to General AI. In what follows I am going to 
discuss how the features that participants reported as lacking in state-of-
the-art artificial systems and that, instead, would be necessary for them to 
be deemed creative, correlate with some of the same crucial aspects that 
currently represent a challenge to researchers in the development of AGI. 
4. CREATIVITY AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE
It seems hard to deny that creativity and intelligence are deeply 
interrelated. What is more contentious, however, is what exactly the 
correlation between the two concepts amounts to. This difficulty is made 
even harder by the fact that both are polysemous terms which are hard to 
demarcate and define.
The notion of creativity can indeed cover a wide spectrum of 
meanings and definitions. It can be described as a subjective property 
of the artist or as a quality that is assigned to the process or product in 
question by the audience. On the other hand, it can also be described as 
an objective property that can be developed through exercise and hard 
work (Simon, 1985). 
Intelligence, for its part, can be defined, for example, as the capacity 
to acquire and apply knowledge, as a more general ability to solve 
problems, or as a more fundamental capacity to adapt to the context 
(Legg, Hutter, 2007).
If one digs deeper into the variety of ways in which the two concepts 
have been described by researchers, it is possible to find many parallels 
and overlaps. The ability to solve novel problems, for example, is a 
capacity which is recognized by many as both a mark of intelligence and 
as a key aspect of creativity (Simon, 1985; Sawyer, 2012; Weisberg, 
1993). Others consider computational creativity as a tool to endow 
artificial systems with the necessary robustness to progress towards a 
more general kind of intelligence (Ventura, 2014, p. 1). The aim of the 
following discussion is precisely that of exploring how the development 
of creative features can be beneficial towards a progress in intelligence 
and viceversa, focusing on the aspects that have been highlighted by 
participants on the survey. 
The concerns in relation to the use of AI systems for the creation 
of artistic products is expressed by many participants with clarity - and 
also with some vehemence - in reply to the open question of the survey. 
























































90 question “How likely do you think it is that AI replaces human artists in 
the next 10 years?”. 176 out of the 203 participants replied extensively to 
the open question, despite it being not compulsory for moving on with the 
questionnaire, thus showing the wish to engage with the topic. 
The majority of replies express skepticism about the possibility for 
AI to become creative: AI systems cannot generate creative products/be 
creative, since they lack experience and contextual knowledge, flexibility, 
feelings, intentionality, and other features, such as unpredictability and the 
ability of self-evaluation.
Some of the participants’ replies identified domain knowledge and 
the ability to transcend it as necessary elements of creativity. On the one 
hand, in fact, knowledge and experience in the field and the capacity to 
successfully engage with the environment are necessary to a creative system 
and it is this breadth of experience that AI is deemed to presently lack:
4130 — “Interesting art usually presupposes a lot of knowledge of 
the history of art.”
5617 — “Good art requires ability and skill and a working knowledge 
of the artistic tradition but also some kind of intention in the sense of 
insight or a message or a theme that is being communicated.  
It is about something. In all probability, AI will produce kitch that  
lacks substance.”
0888 — “Intention is besides the point (so too ‘pleasant’ and 
‘surprising’) - the age itself speaks through the work of art. How is AI 
to acquire history? Context?”
0177 — “Intuition is a refined form of emotional intelligence which 
whilst it seems ‘easy’ is actually highly complex and dependant (sic) 
entirely upon a breadth of experience which AI will not be able  
to replicate.”
The acquisition of domain-knowledge is an aspect which is deemed 
fundamental also by researchers in AGI. One of the methods used in order 
to achieve this aim is to encode in artificial systems a knowledge-base 
containing all human common-sense knowledge (Pennachin, Goertzel, 
2007, p. 3). 
Yet, the possession of broad knowledge in the field at hand is not 
sufficient to develop general intelligence. Successfully operating in a 
common sense informatic situation is a requisite for developing AGI as 
well (McCarthy, 2007, pp. 1175-76). A common sense informatic situation 
is opposed to a bounded informatic situation. It is more general than 
the latter and it requires flexibility and adaptation in understanding and 
engaging with the environment (Goertzel, 2004, p. 41). This flexibility is 
related to the “insight” and “intuition” participants talk about in relation to 
creativity and it is, if possible, even harder to instill into artificial systems 
than broad domain-knowledge.
According to many, in order to be creative, a system does not 
only need to possess domain-knowledge but also the ability to naively 
























































91 for intelligence (McCarthy, 2007, p. 1178; Pennachin, Goertzel, 2007, pp. 
6-7): “Intelligence is the ability to work and adapt to the environment with 
insufficient knowledge and resources.” (Pennachin, Goertzel, 2007, p. 10)
The notion of naivety interrelates with aspects such as spontaneity 
(Dewey, 1934; Kronfeldner, 2009; Sawyer, 2012), unconscious thought 
processing (Baumeister et al., 2014), and independence from rigid 
structures of thought, all of which have been listed in the literature 
among the core traits of creativity. Describing the notion of naivety as 
independence from a model and from external causal inferences does not 
have the consequence of denying the relevance of domain awareness 
and expert knowledge (Glover, 1989; Jordanous, Keller, 2016; Sawyer, 
2012; Simon, 1985; Weisberg, 1993), rather it recognizes that a creative 
process is a process of exploration which does not necessarily demand 
expertise and self-education.
A further aspect that participants considered necessary to creativity 
is the capacity of the agent of self-evaluating its process and products. 
This capacity of introspection, however, is deemed as presently lacking to 
AI systems:
2916 — “AI have no way of judging if what they have created 
necessarily sounds/looks good.”
The ability to assess the process and to “know when to stop” is a relevant 
element of creativity (Moruzzi, 2020bb; Boden, 2004, pp. 43-44; Gaut, 
2010; Guckelsberger et al., 2017; Rhodes, 1961, p. 305). The evaluative 
component of creativity is crucial in the process of trial and error that is 
carried out by agents when engaging in creative endeavors (Sawyer, 
2012, pp. 107-110; Weisberg, 1993, p. 109). This process of self-
assessment should not be a result of external influences of feedback, but 
rather an autonomous process. 
Self-awareness and the autonomy of the system from external 
feedback are essential not only to develop creativity but also to achieve a 
human-level intelligence (Goertzel, 2004, p. 9; McCarthy, 2007, p. 1178; 
Ventura, 2014, p. 6). Introspection is necessary for an agent to learn 
and to adapt to the environment. Indeed, intelligent agents adjust their 
behavior to generate an output that is as much adherent as possible to 
their initial goal.
A last element I consider in this analysis is the relevance of 
embodiment for both creativity and intelligence. In the second part of the 
focus group, I showed participants the music video “Automatica” of the 
musician Nigel Stanford playing music together with robotic arms created 
by the company KUKA Robotics.5  The video had the aim of introducing 
a further variable in the discussion, namely a physical presence of the 
machine that actively performs on stage. 
Despite the embodied presence of the robots - an element that 
would supposedly contribute towards the anthropomorphization of the 
machines (Goldman, 1993; Edmonds, 1994; Sharples, 1994) - participants 
did not perceive them as real “musicians” or “players”. Rather, they 

























































92 reported a lack of engagement with the performance and “with something 
so different from us” (Participant 6). The lack of interaction with the 
audience led a participant to assert that he/she would “rather listen to the 
music but not see the robots” (Participant 9).
Even if the robotic arms had not been deemed sufficient to vouch 
in favor of a display of creativity of the system, though, the relevance of 
embodiment for artistic performances had been acknowledged. Indeed, 
some participants did not exclude the possibility for these artificial agents 
to build a better connection with the public if they develop and assume 
additional “human-like” physical features. Embodiment is, indeed, a 
relevant aspect of both creativity and intelligence: 
5487 — “Human artists have a face and a body, they can play a real 
instrument, they can be talented, and can attract fans for all these 
aspects. No AI will have this sort of carisma [sic]”
Even if state-of-the-art AI may not have been able to impress participants, 
embodiment approaches are undertaken by researchers to advance 
toward AGI (Goertzel, 2004, p. 13). Intelligence develops in physical 
bodies and in physical environments, as agents need to adapt to 
environmental constraints and to interact with the environment. The 
possibility for artificial systems to possess an embodied presence is key to 
progress toward a more general and flexible kind of intelligence.
In part, the opinions expressed by participants and discussed above 
confirm the hypothesis that, in order to be creative, AI systems need 
to develop aspects that researchers are currently working on in order 
to progress towards building AGI. Intuition, unpredictability, and self-
awareness, features that participants indicated as currently lacking in AI 
systems, are elements necessary not only for an agent to be creative, but 
also for AI to reach a broader and more flexible intelligence6. 
In this respect, the survey and its results corroborate the research 
conducted in the field of AGI. However, other elements that were 
not assumed by H1 and that, instead, are deemed essential for the 
development of creativity by participants, emerged. In the next section 
I discuss which other aspects an artificial agent would seem to require 
in order to be deemed creative, discussing at the same time one of the 
possible reasons that may stand behind the participants’ discontent 
against AI.
5. ANTHROPIC AI AND UNCANNY VALLEY
Alongside the features above mentioned, what participants reported as 
lacking in state-of-the-art AI, and that would instead be necessary for 
them to be deemed creative, are aspects that are essentially human, 
such as charisma, personality, experience, and the property of having and 
transmitting feelings and emotions. What emerges from the participants’ 
6  It may be argued that a survey 
of non-experts is not the right kind 
of evidence to prove or disprove 
this hypothesis. Still, these results 
may open to further research 
paths, and can prove to be relevant 
when designing creative AI, as 
























































93 replies is the belief that creativity and art are human-centric domains that 
are, and should remain, the prerogative of humans:
8215 — “The human subjectivity, intentionality and creativity can’t 
be replaced by a machine, because a machine can only imitate the 
objective-formal thinking process.”
3148 — “Pieces of art do not just represent something pretty or 
novel, but are also a representation of our lives and our reality as 
humanity throughout the years. […] An AI would probably never be 
able to have such empathy and views of the world as an artist to 
represent through it’s [sic] art those issues.”
3776 — “Art will remain a human domain because AI is not able to 
have qualitative experience […] only if you taste sadness, you can 
know how to express it in a way that can be sharable with other 
human beings.”
3049 — “Art is an expression of the artist’s innermost thoughts, 
feelings and beliefs and I highly doubt AI will ever be able to achieve 
this.”
2916 — “Coming up with new ideas and expressing creativity is 
something hard to replicate, it’s uniquely human.”
I, thus, put forward a second, more tentative, hypothesis: H2: the 
achievement of an artificial intelligence that possesses the features that 
characterize general intelligence would not suffice to make people accept 
the possibility for AI to be creative.
The reports mentioned above seem to provide evidence in favor of 
H2: the acquisitions of capacities that characterize general intelligence, 
such as common-sense reasoning, flexibility, self-evaluation do not suffice 
to ascribe to AI systems the attribute of “creative”. This assumption is in 
line with the argument according to which, while creativity is a necessary 
element of intelligence, intelligence on its own is not sufficient for 
creativity.7 Something else is needed and the participants’ comments seem 
to lead us toward the conclusion that these additional requirements are 
anthropogenic ingredients.
Assuming H2 is correct, and not even the acquisition of features that 
are key to general intelligence would suffice to make people recognize 
AI as creative, the lack of these features in state-of-the-art AI does not 
provide a sufficient explanation for the participants’ disappointment 
against creative AI. In what follows, I tentatively propose to find a 
motivation for this discontent by interpreting it within the framework of the 
uncanny valley and through the human process of unconscious creation of 
mental models.
The uncanny valley is a theory proposed by the robotics professor 
Masahiro Mori in 1970, which argues for a non-linear relation between 
the degree of human-like appearance and likeability of a robot. In this 
theory, Mori describes how “in climbing toward the goal of making robots 
appear like a human, our affinity for them increases until we come to a 
valley”, what is called, indeed, the uncanny valley (Mori, 2012, p. 98). As 


























































94 soon as we realize that, what looked real, is artificial, we experience an 
uncomfortable feeling of eeriness. 
Mori tries to explain the reason behind the emergence of the 
human reactions associated with the perception of entities which fall into 
this valley through the innate human instinct of self-preservation which 
protects humans from proximal sources of danger (Mori, 2012, p. 100).
The phenomenon of the uncanny valley is rooted in the more general 
concept of anthropomorphism. It is widely acknowledged that humans 
have an ingrained propensity for anthropomorphizing entities and objects 
of their environment, from rocks, to clouds, to robots (Guthrie, 1993). 
Epley and his colleagues explain this tendency with the need to better 
understand and control the environment and to create social bonds (Epley 
et al, 2008). Within the context of the human-machine relation, we can find 
an example of this latter motivation in the connection that humans look for 
in the interaction with chatbots, care robots, or even sex robots (Sparrow, 
Sparrow, 2006). On the other hand, the difficulty that we may experience 
in understanding and interpreting state-of-the-art AI systems is at the 
source of many of the fears towards apocalyptic scenarios where AI takes 
over humans (Bostrom, 2014).
Anthropomorphization does not necessarily occur only in relation 
to physical features and humans may anthropomorphize other entities 
also on the basis of unobservable characteristics (Epley et al., 2008, p. 
144; Gray and Wegner, 2012). In the same way, the phenomenon of the 
uncanny valley does not happen only in relation to human-appearing 
robots but also to artificial entities with a more abstract appearance 
(Walters et al., 2008, p. 160). Moreover, the unnerving feeling associated 
to the uncanny valley may occur not only in relation to the degree of 
human-like appearance of a machine. Rather, also the perception of 
experiences in a machine may underlie this phenomenon. The possibility 
of having experiences is judged as an essentially human characteristic: 
“we are happy to have robots that do things, but not feel things” (Gray, 
Wegner, 2012, p. 129; Airenti, 2015, p. 125) What is unsettling about a 
machine that appears to be capable of love, fear, hate, excitement, etc. is 
that it violates expectancies of experience. Machines apparently capable 
of experience are unnerving, even without a human-like appearance 
(Gray, Wegner, 2012), because we do not accept to attribute this capacity 
to them.
People tend to form a mental model of an entity by making 
assumptions from its features. This mental model serves as a guide to 
the performance that should be expected from that entity. Two scenarios 
may occur in this respect: (i) if the appearance is more advanced than the 
entity’s performance, then humans tend to judge that entity as “dishonest”; 
(ii) if, instead, the appearance is less advanced than the performance, 
people do not fully exploit the entity’s capabilities (Walters, 2008, p. 161).
As discussed, creativity is a human-laden concept which requires 
features such as personality and intentionality. As can be derived from the 
reports, people possess a mental model of machines and artificial entities 
























































95 nor to possess other, paradigmatically human, features such as creativity 
(Gray and Wegner, 2012). The fact that, nevertheless, artificial entities 
instantiate behaviors and activities that are typical of creative agents, is 
perceived as dishonest or, even more drastically, it triggers uncomfortable 
feelings of rejection and discontent against the entities in question.
This is exemplified by the audience’s response to the “Automatica” 
video described above. The robots in the music video instantiated 
movements and behaviors typical of musicians. The mental model that 
the audience had of robots, namely artificial entities without neither 
experience nor charisma, clashed with the involvement in a creative 
activity that the robots seemed to embody on stage. This clash triggered 
the disappointment of the participants who felt somehow “cheated”, as 
they failed to attribute human features such as personality to the robots, 
although the latter were acting “as if” they possessed them.
The discontent expressed by participants to the survey against AI 
engaging in creative activities can, therefore, be tentatively explained 
through a process similar to the one occurring in the uncanny valley 
phenomenon. It is a widespread belief that creativity is characterized 
by essentially human features and, in parallel, the mental model that 
we have of artificial entities does not include the possibility for it to be 
creative. When artificial entities engage in creative activities and stage 
stereotypically human features which they are not deemed capable to 
really possess, they fall into a valley of disapproval and disappointment 
which distances them further from us, instead of increasing the affinity that 
we may have with them. The fact that AI takes part to creative activities 
is disturbing and unnerving because it unconsciously would lead us to 
ascribe to it creativity, a property that people arguably are not willing to 
attribute to artificial entities (Airenti, 2015, p. 124).
The former should not be intended as a definite answer to what the 
motivations for the attitudes people have toward creative AI are. However, 
it might contribute to the debates on human-machine interaction by raising 
questions and proposing tentative answers to the mechanisms that lie 
behind this relationship. Moreover, by interpreting the public discontent 
against creative AI in the light of the uncanny valley phenomenon, this 
work contributes to the discussions regarding the validity of Mori’s theory 
in different sectors of AI research. 
Mori’s warning, I argue, is still valid today and it needs to be 
considered when designing artificial systems that engage in creative 
activities (Salles et al. 2020). This is crucial to prevent the risk of not 
taking advantage of the benefits that may derive from the human-machine 
interaction in the creative sector due to biases or pre-determined mental 

























































In the Seventies, Mori warned against the danger of the uncanny valley 
in our quest toward the achievement of a Human-level intelligence. I 
believe that the results of the study presented in this paper, although 
preliminary, corroborate the validity of this warning. While acknowledging 
the relevance of the work researchers are doing toward the development 
of general intelligence in artificial systems, the participants’ replies point 
out how this is not enough in order to attribute creativity to them.  The 
achievement of features such as flexibility, naivety, embodiment, and 
evaluation – essential for general intelligence – arguably would not suffice 
to make humans accept artificial entities that engage with paradigmatically 
human activities, such as creativity. What motivates the audience’s 
disapproval is not the fact that state-of-the-art AI still exhibits a ‘narrow’ 
kind of intelligence. Rather, this irritation is motivated by the fact that 
artificial entities pretend to possess something that they do not have (yet): 
the capacity of feeling and experiencing like a human. Thus, creative AI 
falls into a sort of uncanny valley, distancing even more from our approval 
and sympathy. 
Still, while the development of AGI may not necessarily lead to 
the development of creative AI, the opposite is less contentiously true: 
research in the field of computational creativity may yield substantial 
advancements toward AGI (Ventura 2014). The investigation on the 
nature of creativity and on how it manifests itself not only in human but 
also in animal and artificial systems should, thus, not be intended as a 
niche discussion but, rather, as a fundamental research which can lay the 
foundations for further studies in artificial intelligence and its relation to 
humans.8 
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